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PATENTS ARE FOREVER: CONSTRUING
THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
TO APPLY TO PRODUCT CONFIGURATIONS
IN SUNBEAM PRODUCTS, INC. V. THE WEST
BEND CO.
INTRODUCTION

Can a company seek protection for its product configuration 1
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995?2 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
recently addressed this issue in the case of Sunbeam Products,Inc.
v. The West Bend Co.3 The court applied the new trademark
dilution statute to product configurations, thereby suggesting that
such configurations could serve as "famous marks" worthy of
protection under the new Act.4 The court's application of this
federal statute to product configurations is a significant extension
of trademark-dilution law because it affords protection to a type of
mark not traditionally recognized in this area of trademark law.
This Recent Development will explore the significance of Sunbeam
Products in the context of the new federal dilution statute.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Since 1930, Sunbeam has manufactured a stand food mixer,
which it now calls "the America Classic."5 The stand mixer, also
called the "Mixmaster," has had its present configuration since
1979.6 The configuration upon which it is based originated in the

1 Product configuration is included under the label "trade dress." Trade dress refers to
the "packaging or labeling of goods" and product configuration refers to the threedimensional design of the product itself. See Melissa R. Gleiberman, Note, From Fast Cars
to Fast Food: Overbroad Protection of Product Trade Dress under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2037, 2039 (1993).
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1996).
4 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

Id.

'Id. at 1547.
'Id.

421

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1997

1

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 7

422

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 4:421

late 1940s and continually evolved until 1979. 7 Since that time,
there have been no changes.'
The "America Classic" accounts for nearly seventy percent of
Sunbeam's annual mixer sales, thus making it far and away
Sunbeam's most popular mixer.9 The "Mixmaster" has been
advertised by Sunbeam for over 60 years. At the time of the
lawsuit, no competitors marketed a mixer that even slightly
resembled the design of the "America Classic.""0 In 1994, however, West Bend attempted to cut into Sunbeam's stand mixer market
share."
In 1995, West Bend aggressively pursued production of its own2
stand mixer and employed a design company to further this goal.
Several renderings were developed, two of which closely resembled
Sunbeam's "Mixmaster." 3 Prospective buyers liked the final
rendering, which was similar to the Sunbeam product. This
rendering was named "the Legend," a term the court found very
comparable to "the America Classic. " 14 When the manufacturer
was hired to produce West Bend's mixer, a catalog depiction of
Sunbeam's Mixmaster was sent along with the aforementioned
rendering. 5 West Bend's director of product development inscribed the words "this one" on the catalog depiction with an arrow
pointing to the mixer made by Sunbeam. 6 West Bend claimed
that the final design was developed by another company, but no
final rendering was ever submitted to the court.' 7 Sunbeam's
sellers submitted affidavits to the court indicating that its buyers
had told them that West Bend's model looked so much like the
Mixmaster that one could not recognize the difference if the
nameplates were covered.'" The buyers also indicated that the

7 Id.

sSunbeam, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
"Id.
1oId.

1Id.
12id.
1 Sunbeam,

39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.

14/d.

15

1d.

16/d.
17id.

'aSunbeam, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
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West Bend mixer was to sell for $20 less than the Sunbeam
model.1
Sunbeam brought suit against West Bend to enjoin it from
marketing its mixer until the dispute could be resolved on the
merits.20 Sunbeam asserted several bases for its cause of action,
including trade dress infringement and dilution in violation of
sections 43(a), (b) and (c) of the Lanham Act, as well as unfair
competition, trade dress infringement, dilution, and false and
misleading advertising under common law.21 The Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi decided that Sunbeam would likely prevail on the merits of its trade dress infringement claims, and after applying the four-factor preliminary
injunction test,22 the court granted the plaintiffs request and
enjoined the23 defendant from either marketing or manufacturing its
new mixer.
The court did not simply rest its decision on the trade dress
infringement claim, but alternatively held that an injunction would
be appropriate for the defendant's violation of the 1995 Federal
Trademark Dilution Act.24 The court noted that such a violation
might include additional statutory remedies for the plaintiff if it
could show that the defendant wilfully intended to cause dilution.
The court determined, however, that such a decision was inappropriate at the preliminary injunction stage and would best be left to
a fact finding body at trial.' The court then enjoined the defendant from "using any other mark or device likely to injure [the]
Plaintiffs business reputation or dilute the distinctive quality of
said Mixmaster(Registered) product design, the Mixmaster(Regis26
tered) trademark, and/or the Sunbeam trademark."

19Id.

2'Id. at 1546.

21 id.

' The four factor test used by the courts was: (1) is there a substantial likelihood that
the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (2) will the plaintiff suffer irreparable injury?; (3) will
the threat of injury to the movant outweigh any damage the injunction might cause to the
opponent?; and (4) will issuance disserve the public interest? Id. at 1548 (citing Blue Bell
Bio-Medical v. Sinbad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (5th Cir. 1989)).
"Sunbeam, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
2415 U.S.C. § 1125(cX1).
"Sunbeam, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
26Id.

at 1556.
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II. LAW OF TRADEMARK DILUTION
A. THE DILUTION DOCTRINE AND ITS COMMON LAW HISTORY

Dilution of a trademark occurs when the ability of a mark clearly
to distinguish one source is weakened or reduced.2 ' Dilution can
occur in two ways. Dilution by blurring occurs when customers see
the owner's mark in a number of different contexts, thus reducing
the "distinctive significance" of such a mark with respect to the
owner's goods.'
Dilution by tarnishment occurs when someone
uses another's mark in a degrading manner, such as a parody. The
use of the mark in this manner has the effect of degrading or
tarnishing the "distinctive quality" of the mark. 9
The dilution doctrine differs fundamentally from the doctrines of
trademark and trade dress protection. Unlike the latter doctrines,
dilution is not concerned with the "likelihood of confusion" that
might occur if no stringent protections for trademarks and trade
dresses exist. The dilution doctrine seeks to protect owners of
trademarks from uses that gradually eviscerate the value of an
owner's trademark and, as such, seeks to protect a property right
in the mark that gives rise to a completely separate cause of
action."0 Even where no likelihood of confusion exists, the owner's
ability to use her mark as a "unique identifier" is lessened because
the public now connects that mark with another user.3 '
Because the dilution doctrine focuses on an owner's property
right in a mark instead of on the presence or absence of confusion,
some commentators have suggested that a stronger rationale is
needed in order to justify its existence. 2 These concerns gave rise
to rules that limit the application of dilution laws in certain
contexts. For example, authorities are split as to whether antidilution rules should be applied in a competitive context. 33 The

21 3 J. THoMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
24.13[1][a], at 24-106 (3d ed. 1995).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 24-107 (emphasis added).
'0 Id. at § 24.13[1][b] (emphasis added).
311&

'
33

MCARTHY, supra note 27, at 24-108.
Id. at § 24.13[2].
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Restatement took the position, as did the new federal statute, that
anti-dilution laws should be applied to unauthorized uses of a mark
on competing goods.34
B. FEDERAL DILUTION STATUTE

In January of 1996, Congress enacted the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995. 85 Under federal law, dilution occurs when
capacity of a mark to distinguish goods or services is diminished.3 6
Thus, under the new statute an owner of a famous mark may seek
an injunction against those diluting such a mark if certain criteria
are met. 37 Essentially, a plaintiff can seek protection for a mark
under this statute by complying with a three-part test. First, there
is the threshold inquiry of whether the mark is famous. The
statute lists several factors a court may use in deciding whether a
mark is famous.' If this requirement is satisfied, an owner of a
famous mark can then seek an injunction against someone using
the mark on two conditions: if the use of the mark occurred after
it became famous, and if the use of the mark dilutes its distinctive
quality.
Under the federal statute, such dilution may give rise to a cause
of action even though the person using the mark is in competition
with its owner.3 9 It is similarly immaterial that there is no
' Id. at 24-115. The position of the Restatement is consistent with the argument made
by McCarthy, supra note 57, that while some consumers may be confused, others will not,
and the perception by consumers that the mark represents two different sources may result
in dilution by blurring.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1996).
Id. at § 1127 (1996).
"Id. at § 1125 (1996).
IId. at § 1125 (cX1XA)-(H) (1996). The eight factors listed in the statute that courts may
consider are: (A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the
duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which
the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D)
the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of
trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition of
the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the mark's owner and the
person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same
or similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was registered under the Act
of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. As the
statute suggests, the court need not limit itself to consideration of only these factors.
3, Id. See supra note 34.
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since dilution is designed specifically for
confusion exists.4' Although some state
apply in a competitive context, the federal
uniformity, makes no such distinction.4 1

III. THE DISTRICT CouRT's APPLICATION OF THE
FEDERAL DILUTION STATUTE

After concluding that an injunction was appropriate for trade
dress infringement, the District Court considered the applicability
of the new federal statute dealing with trademark dilution. In its
opinion, the findings made and used to support the injunction on
trade dress infringement would also support a finding that the
configuration of the Mixmaster would qualify as a "famous mark"
for purposes of the dilution statute.4 2 The court never paused to
consider whether the dilution statute was intended to protect
product configurations.
The court, in the conclusion of its opinion, gave West Bend a list
of elements of the configuration that could be changed in order to
avoid violation of the injunction. 43 The list included everything
from changing the shape of the product itself to changing the
location and design of certain components. 4 4 The court noted,
however, that not all of the elements listed would have to be
changed in order to comply with the injunction. In fact, the court
explicitly listed some changes that could be made in order to avoid
infringement of the plaintiffs trade dress.45
The court failed to indicate whether such changes in the design
of the mixer would also alleviate any dilution problems. Since the
court determined that the trade dress was a "famous mark" based
on its findings regarding the unique design of the product, one
could assume that by requiring West Bend to change its design,

o McCArTHY, supra note 27, at 24.13.
See H.R. REP. No. 374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029.
' Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1555 (S.D. Miss.
1996).
41

4 ld.

" Id.
4
5 d.
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any possible dilution claims would be dissolved along with the
infringement claim. Near the very end of the opinion, however, the
court enjoined West Bend from taking any actions with the product
that would either infringe on the plaintiffs trade dress or which
might dilute the distinctive quality of the plaintiffs product
design." By using the disjunctive "or" instead of "and," the court
seemed to suggest that West Bend could be brought back into court
even if it were not infringing on the Plaintiffs trade dress.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OPINION
The court in Sunbeam incorrectly read the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995 to apply to product configurations. The two
reasons why this statute should not be so construed revolve around
statutory interpretation and are not entirely distinct from one
another. First, the legislative history of the statute suggests that
it was not meant to include dilution of a product's trade dress.
Second, a broad reading such as the one given by the court in
Sunbeam would invite a conflict with federal patent policy, which
should be avoided under commonly held principles of statutory
interpretation.
A. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION

ACT OF 1995
By failing to consider the possibility that the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995 should not be applied to product configurations, the District Court may have ignored the legislative intent of
the statute. The legislative history suggests that the statute may
have been intended to apply only to words and phrases, and not to
product configurations.
Because neither the statute nor the
legislative history ever expressly defines the word "mark" for the
purposes of this statute, determining the legislative intent is not a
simple task. The most persuasive evidence of intent comes not
from what is contained in the statute, but from what is omitted.
As previously mentioned, the text of the statute itself never
explicitly defines "mark" as it is to be understood in the dilution
Id. at 1556.
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context. 47 The legislative history, on the other hand, gives examples of marks that would fall within the scope of the statute. In
the House Report accompanying the bill, examples are used to
illustrate the types of "marks" that would be actionable under the
dilution statute. They include "KODAK pianos" and "BUICK
aspirins."'8 More important than the examples included were
those not included, namely product configurations.
All the
examples used in the report referred to verbal marks. Neither the
text of the statute nor its legislative history ever refer to product
configurations by name or by example. Accordingly, one could
conclude that the federal dilution statute was intended to apply
only to verbal expressions, and not to product configurations.
In construing state anti-dilution laws, some courts have read
their state statutes as applying only to verbal marks. 9 In Olay
Co. v. CococareProducts, Inc.," a federal district court noted that
a New York statute concerned with trademark dilution also failed
to speak of "trade dress." Like the federal statute, the New York
statute referred generally to "marks" and "names."51 Instead of
reading the statute broadly, however, the court in Olay refused to
extend the statute's application to a product's trade dress.52
Likewise, here, a court should not be willing to apply the new
federal dilution statute to trade dress without an explicit manifestation of intent by Congress to the contrary. Like the statute
construed in Olay, the federal statute makes no mention of trade
dress. It refers only to "names" and "marks."' Given the examples used in the legislative history of this statute, which refer only
to verbal expressions, no intent to protect a product's trade dress
can be ascertained. Although enlightening, the legislative history

§ 1127 (1996).
H.R. REP. No. 374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029.
" See Olay Co., Inc. v. Cococare Products, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1028, 1044 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Branch v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). But see
PF Cosmetique, S.A. v. Minnetonka, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 662, 671-673, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying New York's statute to trade dress).
'o Olay Co., Inc. v. Cococare Products, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1028, 1044 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
47 15 U.S.C.

' 1 N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 368-d.

62 Olay Co., Inc. v. Cococare Products, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1028, 1044 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
53 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
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is not itself conclusive in determining whether the federal dilution
statute should be applied to product configurations. Although the
legislative history suggests that the statute should be read
restrictively, there is no language that absolutely excludes a broad
reading like the one found in Sunbeam." In fact, those arguing
for application of the dilution statute to product configurations
might logically conclude that the absence of any explicit exception
would suggest that the statute was not intended to cover only
"verbal" marks. Although the analysis in this section would
dispute such a reading, to conclusively exclude product configurations from the scope of the statute, the next section will challenge
Sunbeam's broad reading of the statute on more substantive
grounds.
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING DILUTION TO PRODUCT
CONFIGURATIONS

Because a claim for dilution does not require a "likelihood of
confusion," a construction of the new federal dilution statute that
encompasses product configurations could create a serious conflict
with federal patent policy. To understand how such a conflict
might occur, it is first necessary to distinguish between an ordinary
claim for infringement and a claim of dilution. To understand the
difference between these claims, one must recognize the types of
harm that these claims seek to prevent, or in the case of dilution,
the type of harm that it does not seek to prevent, namely, consumer
confusion. In order to avoid a conflict with federal patent policy,
trademark-type protection traditionally has been afforded to
product configurations only when there exists a "likelihood of
confusion."5 5 Application of the federal dilution statute to product
configurations, where no showing of "confusion" would be required,
would alter the balance that has heretofore been maintained
between trademark and patent law. To avoid this conflict, the
dilution statute should not be read to encompass product configurations.

U.S.C. § 1125, 1127.
"McCARTHY, supra note 27, at 24-123 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)).
515

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1997

9

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 7

430

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 4:421

1. The Difference Between Ordinary Trade Dress Protectionand
the Dilution Doctrine. Ordinary trade dress protection is confined
by a "likelihood of confusion" requirement, which helps prevent
conflicts between trademark and patent law. The dilution doctrine,
which is fundamentally different and designed to protect a different
harm, contains no such safeguard. Application of a dilution statute
to product configurations would therefore lead to the very conflicts
that ordinary trade dress protection is designed to avoid.
An understanding of the policies underlying ordinary trade dress
protection is needed before one can understand how such a conflict
might arise. Ordinary trade dress protection is premised upon a
"likelihood of confusion" test that asks whether a reasonable buyer
would think that the respective uses of a mark are so similar that
the consumer is likely to think that a "connection or sponsorship
exist[s]." 56
Protecting consumers from confusion, then, is the
principle harm sought to be addressed by traditional trade dress
protection laws.
Anti-dilution laws seek to prevent a different sort of harm. As
one commentator noted, they are designed to fill in where ordinary
"likelihood of confusion" laws leave off.57 Instead of trying to
prevent the direct mental associations consumers form when
confused by similar products, anti-dilution laws seek to remedy the
harm caused when a distinctive link between the plaintiffs mark
and its goods or services is "blurred" or "tarnished" by the defendant's continued use of the mark.' Although a mental connection
by consumers is presumed, the type of mental link necessary for
dilution to occur necessarily excludes the type of mental link that
must be present for "confusion" to occur.
For dilution to occur, the consumer cannot be deceived; the
consumer must recognize that the two products have different
sources.5 9 Once the consumer understands that a mark no longer
distinguishes one particular product or entity, then the harm
sought to be avoided has already occurred. The harm in this
instance is not to the consumer, but is instead an injury to the
owner of the mark.
5MCCARTHY,

57

supra note 27, at 24-108.

Id.

"Id.

5Id,

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol4/iss2/7

10

Marsh: Patents Are Forever: Construing the Federal Trademark Dilution Ac

1997] SUNBEAM PRODS., INC. V. THE WEST BEND CO.

431

Although dilution and trade dress infringement are mutually
exclusive with respect to individual consumers, a plaintiff bringing
an infringement claim can alternatively plead an injury by way of
dilution."
The plaintiff will then have to show that various
groups of consumers were harmed in different ways.
Some
consumers could provide the basis for an infringement claim
because of their confusion, while others who were not confused
could nonetheless be the basis of a dilution claim. In this way, a
plaintiff suing for infringement could theoretically recover as well
on a claim for dilution. 1
The fact that a plaintiff can sue for both dilution and infringement should not lead one to conclude that these theories are
interchangeable. Their theoretical underpinnings are such that
these two claims should always be viewed as separate and distinct
causes of action designed to remedy very different sorts of harm.6 2
A plaintiff alleging dilution of a trademark can do so without any
showing of confusion. Because confusion need not be shown, a
conflict can arise with federal patent policy if dilution laws apply
to product configurations.
2. The Conflicts With FederalPatent Policy. Before the enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, the dilution doctrine
was essentially a creature of state law. However, state law dilution
claims were occasionally challenged by arguments for federal
preemption. Some courts and commentators have argued that state
dilution laws should be preempted by federal trademark law
because of an apparent conflict with the overriding policy objectives
of both Federal Trademark Law and Federal Patent Law.'
The
enactment of national legislation providing a federal cause of action
for dilution claims rendered such contentions moot for preemption
purposes.

6o Id, at 24-109.
61 MCCARTHY, supra
62

note 27.
Id. at 24-109. But see James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266
n.16, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a "trademark likely to confuse is
necessarily a trademark likely to dilute'). As McCarthy notes, this conclusion is improper.
Any single consumer either perceives an affiliation between a mark and its source or does
not perceive such an affiliation. That the mark is strong enough to cause confusion as to the
source does not mean by definition that the mark must have been diluted. Dilution has not
occurred if the person is confused as to the source, because dilution presupposes no confusion
as to the source of the mark. MCCARTHY, supra note 27, at 24-109.
3 McCARTHY, supra note 27, at 24-121.
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Although the arguments for preemption are no longer valid, the
reasoning behind these arguments can still be used to demonstrate
the policy conflicts that could result from an overbroad reading of
the federal dilution statute. Consider the reasoning behind the
preemption argument in the following case. In Escada AG v. The
Limited, Inc.," the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the plaintiffs dilution claim. The plaintiff was
seeking, inter alia, to enjoin the defendant under a New York antidilution law from "making, using, or selling" a bottle design that
supposedly imitated the design of the plaintiffs bottle.
The District Court recognized the conflict that would arise if the
plaintiff was allowed to bring a dilution claim based on its product
configuration. Because the makers of the bottle could have secured
a design patent for the bottle, the New York dilution law as applied
in this context went beyond the amount of regulation permitted
under the Supreme Court's decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.6" In Bonito Boats, the Court noted the
longstanding rule that "state regulation of intellectual property
must yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by
Congress in our patent laws."' In recognizing the imbalance that
would result by applying the New York dilution law to a product
configuration, the Court in Bonito Boats denied protection and held
that where the subject matter is potentially patentable the state
interest in protecting the manufacturer must yield to the national
interest in uniform patent law.6 7
Extrapolating these principles and applying them to the federal
dilution statute, it becomes clear that the national interest in
protecting manufacturers from dilution must also yield to the
established national interest in "uniform patent law." As the Court
in Bonito Boats recognized, there exists a constant tension between
the desire to reap the full measure of our "inventive resources" and
the "need to create an incentive to deploy those resources.'

810 F. Supp. 571, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1970 (1993).
Escada,810 F. Supp. at 573 (quoting from Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunde? Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989)).
" Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
67

Id. at 153.

6 Id. at 152.
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Requiring plaintiffs to meet a likelihood of confusion standard is
critical to maintaining the balance underlying the federal patent
scheme. Patent law encourages consumers to bring their products
to the market while at the same time fostering competition in the
marketplace. 9 In order to balance these objectives, patent law
recognizes a manufacturer's monopoly for a limited period of time.
This limited monopoly encourages the manufacturer to bring his
goods to the market while at the same time allowing competition,
because at the end of this limited period, other manufacturers can
copy the features of the original manufacturer's invention without
incurring any legal penalty.
In contrast, trade dress protection extends indefinitely, so that a
manufacturer could be protected from trade dress infringement for
the life of the product. If trade dress protection was premised on
the notion of protecting the manufacturer's property rights rather
than on consumer confusion, the objectives of encouraging competition would be destroyed because the limited period of time for
patentable products could be extended indefinitely.
As the
Supreme Court stated in Bonito Boats, a state law that does not
mandate proof of "likely confusion" is in conflict with federal policy
because it can grant this "patent-like" protection.7" This same
"patent-like" protection could result under the new federal dilution
statute if it is read to include trade dress.
Like the state statutes that preceded it, the new federal statute
does not require a plaintiff bringing a dilution claim to show "likely
confusion."" If a defendant is found to have diluted the plaintiffs
trade dress, lack of confusion by consumers will be no defense. The
point of the statute is not to prevent confusion; the purpose is to
protect the owner's mark from being "diluted" by another's use of
that mark.7 2 The owner of the mark, in this case a type of trade
dress, receives this "patent-like" protection without going through
the rigors of acquiring a patent, and without being given protection
for only a limited number of years. The balance between giving
developers an incentive to enter into the market and encouraging
7 0 See

Gleiberman, supra note 1, at 2059.
McCARTHY, supra note 27, at 24-123 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,

Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)).
71

15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1996).

Id. at § 1127 (1996).
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market competition becomes skewed. The developer will certainly
have an incentive to enter into the market, but no longer will
patent policy be able to encourage competition, since a patent
holder can escape the time limitations found in federal patent law
and seek indefinite protection under the new federal trademark
dilution statute.
Reading the statute too broadly, as the court did in Sunbeam,
would undercut the statutory scheme underlying federal patent
law.73 Following the statutory rules of construction given by the
Supreme Court, the federal dilution statute should be read so as to
avoid such a conflict. 74 This conflict can only be avoided if the
statute is read so as to exclude trade dress from protection under
the act.
The facts of Sunbeam seem to suggest that the West Bend
Company deliberately tried to mimic Sunbeam's product. 75 In
light of this, the court may have been too willing to grant the
requested injunction. While West Bend's seemingly bad behavior
may help explain the court's actions, it certainly does not justify
them. The court never paused to consider whether the reference to
a "mark" in the statute should be read so as to include a product
configuration. Similarly, the court never considered the possible
implications of such a reading, namely, the inevitable conflict with
federal patent law. Because no justifications for its interpretation
of the statute were given, one can only speculate as to why the
court read the statute to include product configurations.
Speculation concerning the court's true intentions aside, the
implications from this decision could be quite significant. The court
71 See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979), where the Supreme
Court summarized the policies underlying the patent system as follows:
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it
promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to
permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires; third,
the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that
ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.

Id.

74

See Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2326 (1995)
("When two statutes are capable of co-existence ... it is the duty of the courts, absent a

clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective")
(internal quotations omitted).
75 See Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1547 (S.D.
Miss. 1996).
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in Sunbeam may not have given proper consideration to the
dilution claim because it had already decided to issue an injunction
based on their findings on the claim for trade dress infringement.
But the court's decision to issue an injunction on the claim for
dilution cannot be considered dicta. The court specifically enjoined
the defendant from any use of its product that might dilute the
plaintiffs product. Therefore, a court that actually takes the time
to consider how to apply the new statute might look to this case as
persuasive authority for the notion that the new federal statute
applies to product configurations. For the reasons discussed, such
a reading would be erroneous.
Who will benefit should the statute continue to be read in such
a broad manner? Consumers are unlikely to benefit from such an
interpretation. Since the new statute contains no "likelihood of
confusion" requirement, 6 the legislation will not remedy consumer
confusion about the source of the trade dress. Therefore, consumers are unlikely to receive any qualitative benefits.
As for quantitative benefits, it appears that the likely beneficiaries will be the owners of the trade dress. In the Sunbeam case for
instance, the injunction issued by the court prevented West Bend
from marketing their stand-mixer at a price substantially lower
than the price listed for the Sunbeam model." Putting aside all
arguments made by the plaintiffs as to consumer confusion, under
the court's reading of the new dilution statute, the plaintiff could
have obtained an injunction only on the dilution issue. The effect
of such an injunction would be to deny consumers the ability to
purchase a similar product for a substantially lower price even
where there existed no confusion as to the source of the product.
V. CONCLUSION

In construing the new Federal dilution statute, the court in
Sunbeam interpreted the statute in a manner inconsistent with
both the legislative history and the policy objectives behind federal

76 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1996).
77 see Sunbeam Products,

Inc. v. The West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1547
(S.D. Miss. 1996) (discussing West Bend's plan to market its stand mixer for $20 less than
that of the Plaintiffs).
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patent law. By failing to consider whether the statute should have
been applied to a product's trade dress, the court set a dangerous
precedent in applying the new statute.
Hopefully, a court construing the new statute will look to the
legislative history and to the principles of statutory construction
and reach the conclusion reached herein: that the federal trademark dilution statute was not intended to apply to product
configurations. A contrary conclusion could have disastrous effects
in the patent community. Inventors and developers could destroy
the carefully crafted balance that is embodied in the federal patent
scheme by seeking trade dress protection for their designs. By
granting this seemingly infinite protection, the goal of encouraging
market competition by limiting the amount of time that the
protection will extend is thwarted.
In short, plaintiffs could protect the design of their product
indefinitely. Since any attempt by the defendant to manufacture
a product with a similar design would reduce the ability of the
plaintiff's dress to identify its source distinctively, the defendant
would be unable to market its product with a similar design. Such
a result is, to pardon the phrase, "patently" inconsistent with
federal intellectual property policy. Further, this result can be
avoided by a more enlightened reading of the statute.
STEPHEN K. MARSH
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